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1. Horizon1 is a Research Institute centred at The University of Nottingham and a Research Hub within 
the UKRI Digital Economy programme2. Horizon brings together researchers from a broad range of 
disciplines to investigate the opportunities and challenges arising from the increased use of digital 
technology in our everyday lives. Prof. McAuley is Director of Horizon and Principal Investigator of 
the EPSRC-funded DADA3 (Defence Against Dark Artefacts) project, addressing smart home IoT 
network security, and its acceptability and usability issues, the ESRC-funded CaSMa4 (Citizen-centric 
approaches to Social Media analysis) project to promote ways for individuals to control their data 
and online privacy, and the EPSRC-funded UnBias5 (Emancipating Users Against Algorithmic Biases 
for a Trusted Digital Economy) project for raising user awareness and agency when using algorithmic 
services. Dr Koene was a lead researcher of the CaSMa and UnBias projects, is Research co-
Investigator on the EPSRC-funded ReEnTrust6 (Rebuilding and Enhancing Trust in Algorithms) project 
and chairs the working group for developing the IEEE P7003 Standard for Algorithm Bias 
Considerations. Dr Jiahong Chen is a Researcher Fellow of Horizon, working on the DADA project and 
a book project based on his doctoral research on regulating online advertising. 
 
Propagation and impacts of misinformation 
Q1. What impact have digital technologies had on patterns of information consumption? What  
evidence exists on their wider social impact? 
2. The prevalent business model of major sources of online information, including news outlets, blogs, 
and social media, depends heavily on monetisation of granular user profiles. The “ad tech” industry 
has developed advanced technologies, such as programmatic trading and universal IDs, to target 
internet users with highly personalised content. This may change the patterns of information 
consumption in several ways: First, internet users may find themselves trapped in their own “echo 
chambers” with a feedback loop of information from like-minded groups, which may intensify the 
polarisation of the society.7 Second, political campaigners may gain unfair advantage by exploiting 
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online personal data, as shown by the ICO’s investigation into the Cambridge Analytica scandal.8 
Third, conspiracy and pseudoscientific theorists may find it easier to channel their messages to 
potentially more susceptible audiences, which is evidenced by, for example, the revelation about the 
possibility to target social media users based on a “vaccine controversies” category.9 
 
Q2. How do digital technologies contribute to the spread of misinformation? 
3. Many of the new technological phenomena are “neutral” in the sense that they can facilitate the 
dissemination of information regardless of the nature of such information. Social media, for 
example, have significantly augmented individuals’ ability to create and share information, a large 
part of which, however, can be misinformation. The rise of marketing by online influencers has 
further contributed to the spread of misleading or mistaken information.10 Deepfake is another 
controversial area where synthetic videos can be created to help circulate false news.11 
 
Q3. What tools exist to create synthetic text, audio or visual media, and what are the likely near-
term future developments of these technologies? 
4. Machine learning has been applied to create machine-generated content, including misinformation. 
Text-based applications, such as natural language generation, for example, have been proved 
capable of fabricating convincing news stories.12 Image- and video-based applications are also widely 
used in context less associated with the spreading of misinformation, such as smartphone camera 
filters, but have also raised concerns about user privacy, dignity and mental health.13 These 
technologies can be easily repurposed for conducting political or personal attacks.14 
 
Detection and tracing of misinformation 
Q4. Which technologies can currently be used to identify or trace misinformation? What are the 
strengths and weaknesses of these technologies? 
5. Current approaches to detecting misinformation can be largely categorised as text-based, image-
based and profiled-based. Text-based strategies identify misinformation by analysing lexical, 
semantic and statistical features.15 Image-based solutions identify deepfakes by examining biological 
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by distinguishing abnormal user behavioural patterns.18 
 
Q5. What technological advancements in the next ten years could improve the ability to identify or 
trace misinformation? 
6. Provenance has been held out as a solution to this problem as a means to clearly identify 
trustworthy information, and hence, by implication, everything else should be untrusted. The World 
Wide Web Consortium had a programme of work on Provenance culminating in 201319 which is 
widely ignored – one issue is that it tries to revert the unstructured web to the mentality of 
databases and predefined schemas. Rather, for provenance, we must draw the lessons from web 
search and adopt statistical means to define probabilistic provenance graphs. The challenge will be 
that a significant number of the original sources of misinformation are not openly available on the 
web, so a global system would require the collaboration of many platform providers and the 
federation of provenance information. 
 
Q6. What role could these technologies play in building a trustworthy information environment? 
7. The algorithmic editorial processes that are at the heart of much social media are currently 
statistical optimisations with a primary goal to drive profit. It would not be surprising to find that this 
is the antithesis of  provenance, so challenges will include whether citizens have any faith that asking 
for “provenance ordered search results” or equivalent has not been tampered with based on 
commercial considerations. 
 
Q7. Are there any current regulatory or policy barriers to the successful development or 
deployment of detection technologies? 
8. Currently in the UK, there is no primary legislation prohibiting the publication or circulation of 
misinformation. Nor is there a general obligation for platforms to monitor or remove 
misinformation. Equally, however, the law does not stop platforms from taking measures to address 
misinformation, although such measures must be fully in line with human rights standards, 
especially with respect to freedom of speech. The adoption of detection technologies by online 
platforms are facing two major regulatory barriers: The lack of economic incentives20 and the legal 
uncertainty of what counts as misinformation21. The Government’s Online Harms White Paper 
proposes to address these issues by introducing a statutory duty of care,22 but the approach is 
subject to criticisms about the unclear definition of “harm”.23 
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